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This research examined the federal government’s historical use of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) to determine whether or not Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
(ESPC) should be applied to mobile assets.  Third party financing of capital 
improvements through PPPs has resulted in reduced energy consumption and savings to 
tax-payers.  For example, to modernize existing facilities, the government has used 
private corporations, such as Hannon-Armstrong, LLC, to overcome shortfalls in 
appropriated funds.  Third party financing and ESPCs present viable solutions to 
modernizing and reducing the energy consumption of the government’s mobile assets.   
The first part of this research examines Hannon Armstrong’s “fee for service 
contract” solution to funding the vital fiber-optic link near the Arctic Circle.   The second 
part explores the history of the Energy Saving Performance Contracts (ESPCs), which 
have helped reduce energy consumption throughout the federal government.     
Historically, this program has only been used for fixed assets.   There is little debate over 
the success of these contracts in reducing energy consumption.  The authors conclude that 
applying Energy Savings Performance Contracts to mobile assets could further reduce the 
energy consumption of the Department of Defense (DoD) and save tax-payers millions of 
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John K. Shank, Ph.D.:  Dr. Shank was a support advisor on this project; his 
contribution and inspiration were vital to its success.  Sadly, towards the end of this 
project, on March 30, 2006, John died of heart failure at the age of 65.  John instructed all 
the students who authored this document during their MBA studies at the Naval 
Postgraduate School; his untimely death touched us all.    
John was the Noble Foundation Professor of Management emeritus at the Tuck 
School at Dartmouth and a visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Outside 
the United States, he taught MBA programs in Amsterdam, Barcelona, Ghent, Helsinki, 
Lausanne, London, Paris, Prague and Stockholm.  He published 17 books, more than 100 
case studies and 100 articles in leading journals in accounting, finance and management; 
his most recent research interests centered on the strategic cost management theme, 
which he pioneered.   
Professor Shank earned an AB degree from Oberlin College, an MBA from the 
University of Pittsburgh, and a doctorate in accounting from Ohio State University.  He 
was a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Beta Gamma Sigma, Beta Alpha Psi and the American 
Accounting Association and a former member of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, the Institute for Management Accountants, and the Financial 
Executives Institute.  Before joining the Dartmouth faculty, he taught at Ohio State 
University for eight years and the Harvard Business School for seven years.  Prior to that, 
he worked in public accounting for both of the firms that merged to form Deloitte & 
Touche. He also worked in private industry as controller of a small frozen foods 
manufacturing firm.  
 Professor Shank was active in the Management Accounting Section of the 
American Accounting Association.  He was the founding chairman of the Management 
Accounting Executive Committee of the AICPA and the founding chairman of the 
steering committee for the AICPA’s Center for Excellence in Financial Management. He 
was a founding member of the AICPA’s “Group of 100” advisory board, and was editor-
in-chief of the Handbook of Cost Management.  He recently served on the editorial 
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boards of Cost Management and Advances in Management Accounting.  He was a 
member of the Board of Directors at Lazard, Ltd.  
Professor Shank was also involved in consulting projects and management 
education seminars with more than 100 major companies over a 40-year period, including 
General Electric, IBM, AT&T, Chase Bank, American Express, Digital Equipment, 
Coca-Cola, Eastman Kodak, Johnson and Johnson, Citicorp, Allied-Signal, Cargill, 
Brooks Brothers, Lucent Technologies, Fortune Brands, International Paper, Alcan 
Aluminum and Hewlett Packard.  He also worked as a consultant to the World Bank, the 
French Ministry of Post Telephone and Telegraph, and the National Association of 
Independent Schools.  Recent assignments included projects with Giant Eagle 
Supermarkets, HJ Heinz, and the U.S. Navy (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations). 
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Hannon Armstrong, LLC: The cases developed in our research were focused on 
acquiring combat capability through innovative uses of public-private partnerships.  We 
studied currently relevant innovative financing solutions of Hannon Armstrong, an 
Annapolis, MD based financial services firm that specializes in the federal market.  Their 
assistance has been a tremendous asset to us as we have compiled this research data.  A 
special thanks to Jeffrey Eckel, President and CEO of Hannon Armstrong and Gerald 
Koenig, Vice President responsible for homeland security and defense programs. 
Nayantara Hensel, Ph.D.:  Dr. Hensel contributed guidance to this project.  
Nayantara Hensel is an assistant professor of finance and economics at the Graduate 
School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  She received her 
B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  INTENDED PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to study federal government’s historical use of 
public-private partnerships and different views on the issue.  Through case studies, we 
will examine innovative uses of public-private partnerships to overcome shortfalls in 
appropriated funds.  We will determine whether applying Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts (ESPCs) to mobile assets is a viable solution to reducing energy consumption, 
overcoming funding constraints, and reducing energy costs, which will save tax-payer 
dollars.  The Department of Defense is the largest consumer of energy within the federal 
government. About 60 percent of the DoD’s energy consumption is used to operate 
aircraft, tanks, ships, and other vehicles.1  Utilizing ESPCs, which are based on public-
private partnerships, could help reduce the DoD’s fuel burden, enhance warfighting 
capabilities, and extend the service life of mobile assets.   In order to understand how an 
EPSC is structured it is important to first understand the role of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). 
B. HISTORY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPS) 
PPPs establish a cooperative partnership between the public and private sectors in 
order to pool resources towards a common goal.  PPPs allow a public agency to access 
the private sector’s technical expertise, knowledge, insight, and capital to achieve 
mutually beneficial goals.  These partnerships can be used by agencies at the federal, 
state and local levels.  Contracts for PPPs are developed in such a way that control in an 
activity is given to the entity, either public or private, that is in the best position to control 
and achieve the desired results.  PPP contracts are structured so that they provide 
incentives to the controlling entity to achieve efficiencies and reduce costs in performing 
activities.   In order to meet these performance goals, the controlling entity is given 
maximum flexibility to develop its work structure and processes to achieve its directives.  
                                                 
1 Data compiled from Defense Science Board Task Force on Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons 
Platforms, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden, January 2001 pg. 3. 
The federal government has increasingly relied on public-private partnerships for 
the accomplishment of a number of agency activities.  In the broadest sense, the federal 
government is a big box with inputs and outputs.  All federal outputs are services; 
whether it is air traffic control, delivered mail or the Normandy invasion.  The federal 
government manufactures virtually nothing.  Now, if the federal government produces 
services, their inputs can be pure services or (as is usually the case) a combination of 
goods and services.  These inputs all predominantly come from the private sector.  So the 
question is what mix of private sector goods (inputs) and private sector services (inputs) 
is optimal from an efficiency viewpoint.   
PPPs are used throughout the federal government in areas such as: technology and 
pharmaceutical research, depot level maintenance, transportation projects, military 
housing and renovation, supply of utilities, and education programs.   These partnerships 
help the government agencies accomplish projects or activities in a faster and more 
efficient manner.    
Legislation and federal acquisition regulations that have impeded the use of 
public-private partnerships have slowly been changed to allow the federal government to 
more easily enter into partnerships and making it more lucrative for private firms.2  
Figure 1 illustrates legislation that has affected PPPs from 1955 to 2000.3
 
Year 
                                                 
2 RAND Corporation. (1998).  Use of Public-Private Partnerships to Meet Future Army Needs. Ch 3, 
p. 21. 
3 Ibid, p. 20. 
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Figure 1:  Timeline of Major Legislative Actions Affecting PPPs4
Over the past twenty years legislative actions have introduced Cooperative 
Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), Cooperative Agreements (CAs), and 
Other Transactions (OTs) that have enabled the military to more effectively partner with 
private entities.4  Figure 1 shows the major legislative changes that have occurred from 
1955 until 2000.  Many of these changes have reduced barriers that prevented the public 
and private sectors to work together.  As legislative barriers are reduced, the federal 
government is able to establish more partnerships and use innovative and creative 
solutions to overcome resource constraints.   In conducting its research, the RAND 
Corporation noted that the U.S. Army has realized the following benefits by utilizing 
PPPs:5   
• leverage its assets, reduce capital investments, reduce costs 
• decrease outlays to achieve infrastructure, intellectual property, or financial 
arrangement goals 
• increase the value of its property or other assets 
• create new capabilities or assets to accomplish its military mission 
• influence technology early and get equipment fielded earlier and/or possibly at 
lower cost 
• improve readiness 
• receive a stream of revenue to find projects to help the Army accomplish its 
mission 
There are many different types of Public Private Partnerships.  This research 
focuses on two major types, “fee for service” and ESPCs.  One of the major differences 
between traditional procurement, a “fee for service” contract, and an ESPC is not what 
goods and services are being bought by the federal government, but how the contractor 
gets paid.  Under a traditional procurement model, a contractor gets paid when the goods 
are delivered.  Federal employees traditionally perform the bulk of the labor required to 
convert the goods into a service.   
                                                 
4 RAND Corporation. (1998).  Use of Public-Private Partnerships to Meet Future Army Needs. Ch. 3, 
p. 20. 
5 Ibid, Ch. 1, p. 2-3.  
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Under an ESPC, the contractor installs energy savings equipment and gets paid 
when and if the installed equipment produces savings.  Contractors under a “fee for 
service” contract get paid once they have performed the work that they were contracted to 
perform, i.e., mow the lawn, deliver the ammo to Baghdad, or provide some other type of 
service to the government.   
Another major difference between traditional funding approaches, “fee for 
service,” and ESPCs is who bears the costs that result if the service is performed badly: 
the taxpayer or the contractor?  In “fee for service” and ESPCs the contractor assumes 
most of the risk.  In traditional funding approaches, the taxpayer assumes the risk and 
there is little accountability (what recourse does the taxpayer have if the service provider 
at Tinker AFB takes 25 more days than required to overhaul a TF-33 engine?).  Under a 
“fee for service” or ESPC type contract, the contractor is held accountable for 
performance by withholding payment for services that do not meet predetermined 
performance criteria.   The assumption of risk is one of the major advantages of using 
PPP to perform certain functions within the federal government.    
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II. CASE STUDY ONE 
A.  INNOVATIVE USE OF FEE FOR SERVICE CONTRACT 
This section presents an innovative financing arrangement by Hannon Armstrong, 
an Annapolis, Maryland based financial services firm that specializes in federal contract 
financing.  We will examine Hannon Armstrong’s “fee for service contract” financing 
solution for providing a vital fiber-optic link near the Arctic Circle.  Under a fee for 
service contract, title for the assets does not transfer to the federal government.  The 
familiar defense acquisition management acronym, Contractor-Owned and Contractor-
Operated (COCO) applies to the assets which are used by the government in this 
scenario.   
1. Introduction to the Arctic Circle Fiber-Optic Scenario 
The United States (U.S.) government collects critical environmental and weather 
information on Svalbard Island, Norway, a unique location on an island above the Arctic 
Circle.  Information gathered at Svalbard was sent via an Intelsat satellite to the U.S.   
This communication method was expensive, slow, and unreliable.   
The Norwegian Space Agency and Tyco Telecommunications, along with the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the United States Air Force 
(USAF), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) jointly 
developed a technical solution to the problem.  This consisted of installation of a dual 
1300km fiber-optic cable-ring communications network at the Svalbard Satellite 
Tracking Station (SvalSat), which is located on Plateau Berget, Spitzbergen Island, 
Svalbard.   
However, despite the project’s huge future savings to the U.S. government, 
appropriated funds were not available for the required $40 million initial capital 
investment.  The answer was a service contract from the Norwegian Space Agency and 
an innovative third party financing arrangement using Hannon Armstrong to finance the 
$40 million capital expenditure. 
Svalbard’s position at 78 degrees North Latitude allows contact with polar-
orbiting satellites during all 14 daily orbits, making SvalSat an ideal location for tracking 
these satellites that stations in lower latitudes can not match.  The installation of the 
communications cable is a vital component of the satellite facility SvalSat’s infrastructure 
and a primary driver for NASA’s and NOAA’s participation with the Norwegian Space 
Center (NSC) at SvalSat. 
The Project is geographically depicted on the following map, Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2:  Fiber Optic Scenario Project Map of Cable  
 
2. Background of the Arctic Circle Fiber-Optic Project 
NOAA, NASA, and the DoD collect data from satellites in polar orbits that 
provide weather and environmental information covering all areas in the world.  This data 
supports such critical and diverse uses as: regional weather forecasting, aviation forecasts 
(domestic, military and international), severe storm and flood reconnaissance and 
warnings, solar and space environmental forecasts, hydrologic forecasts, seasonal and 
long term weather monitoring and forecasting, environmental air quality monitoring, and 
defense tactical decision information and weapon systems utilization. 
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Polar-orbiting satellites orbit the earth from pole to pole.  As the Earth rotates, 
each pass covers a different swath of the terrain below.  Typically, these satellites orbit 
600 miles above the Earth and carry a wide variety of sensors that provide data for 
numerous applications.  These are in considerable contrast to the typical communications 
satellites in geo-stationary orbits that are approximately 22,000 miles above the Earth’s 
surface and orbit at a speed synchronized with the Earth’s rotation, thereby staying over 
one place on the Equator.  The polar-orbiting satellites represent the principal means of 
collecting data over vast areas of the globe.  The data for aviation weather, global 
shipping, disaster prediction, etc., are of vital interest to the U.S. Government. 
U.S. weather, oceanographic, and environmental data have historically been 
collected by a variety of separate systems and agencies: by NASA for scientific and 
environmental use, by NOAA for civilian use, and by DoD for military use.  In 1994, the 
U.S. Congress created the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System (NPOESS) as the next generation system to monitor global environmental 
conditions and collect data related to weather, atmosphere, oceans, land and near-space 
environment.   
In creating NPOESS, Congress recognized that combining the existing polar 
satellite systems from NASA, NOAA, and the DoD would result in a more cost effective, 
and better performing integrated system.  The President endorsed this initiative, signing 
Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2.6  NPOESS is managed by the Integrated 
Program Office (IPO), which organizationally resides within the Department of 
Commerce (DoC).  The IPO employs personnel from NOAA, DoD, NASA, and the 
DoC.7  IPO is housed within, and is administratively part of, NOAA in Silver Spring, 
Maryland.  In August 2002, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon were awarded a $2.9 
                                                 
6 Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-2; accessed March 08, 2006; 
http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/About/NSTC-2.html 
7 NOAA Satellite and Information Services website; Integrated Program Office (IPO); accessed Mar 
08, 2006; http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/About/ipo_org.html 
billion contract to build and support the first two NPOESS through 2012, with options for 
an additional four satellites through 2019 for a total of $4.5 billion.8
The chart in Figure 3 illustrates how NPOESS is currently organized. 
 
Figure 3:  NPOESS Organization 
From NOAA Satellite and Information Service website; 
http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/About/ipo_org.html; accessed Mar 10, 2006 
 
3. The Economic Aspect of the Arctic Circle Fiber-Optic Project 
The existing NOAA and DoD satellites that will ultimately be replaced or 
augmented by NPOESS will increase their use of the SvalSat facility over the next 
decade.  As additional sensors and capabilities are added there will be a greater need for 
both command and control and data transmission. NOAA and the DoD missions require 
                                                 
8 The original NPOESS contract was awarded in 2002 to TRW, Inc.  Later the same year, TRW was 
acquired by Northrop Grumman, so Northrop Grumman became the prime contractor for NPOESS.  
Raytheon was formally teamed with TRW at the time of contract award and thus automatically became a 
subcontractor upon award of the prime contract to TRW and that subcontractor status was unaffected by 
Northrop Grumman becoming the prime contractor.  
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an enduring capability to acquire, store, and disseminate to processing centers, global and 
regional meteorological, environmental, and associated data at varying refresh rates.  
These data shall include, but are not limited to information on imagery, atmospheric 
profiles of temperature and moisture, and other specialized meteorological, terrestrial, 
climatic, oceanographic, and solar-geophysical data, as well as a search and rescue 
capability to support world-wide U.S. Government (Military and Civil) operations and 
high-priority programs.   
With the additional requirements of the NPP and NPOESS programs, combined 
NOAA/NASA telecommunications costs using existing leased satellite capacity for 
telecommunications transmission would have been approximately $10 million per year.  
The installation of a dual fiber-optic ring communications network to SvalSat would offer 
expected combined savings of $2.5 million per year over the repayment period, and 
nearly the full $10 million to be saved annually by the U.S. Government over the 
remainder of the 25-year initial period of operations.  
4. Innovative Financing Solution of the Arctic Circle Fiber-Optic Project 
The contractor that was chosen to install the fiber-optic network, Tyco 
Telecommunications (US), Inc. (Tyco Telecom), Princeton, N.J., declined to accept 
deferred annual payments from the U.S. agencies, said Rolf Skår, Director General of the 
agency.  
“To get Svalbard into the picture, we had to do something,” Skår said.  “The 
challenge was how to finance the project…none of the suppliers was willing to 
accept deferred payments.” 9
 
Tyco Telecom, a world leader in the installation and servicing of state-of-the-art 
submarine fiber optic cable systems, won an international tender issued by NSC to supply 
and install the project.  This consisted of a dual fiber optic cable ring, with each segment 
connecting the SvalSat station in Longyearbyen, Svalbard to the Telenor (the main 
Norwegian telecom utility) system in Halstad on the Northern Cape of Norway, the 
nearest part of the European mainland.  Tyco will be providing terminals and other 
                                                 
9 Defense News; Finding Savings Up Front-Private Investors Finance Fiber-Optic Link Near Arctic 
Circle; Gopal Ratnam; Nov. 17, 2003; Vol. 18, No. 43. 
related equipment to complete the project as part of its scope.  Each segment of the ring 
will run approximately 1400 km (see Figure 2). The dual cable ring system provides 
necessary redundancy in the unlikely event one cable requires repair. Capacity of the 
project will be 20 GB per second over each of the two segments of the line. 
The economic solution that was ultimately chosen was to convert planned 
operating dollar expenditures into a stream of payments that could support the capital 
investment required in the “fee for service” or “paid from savings” contract, as depicted 
in Figure 4.  By converting annual operating payments for rented communications 
satellite capacity into service contract payments for a next generation data 
communication system, the U.S. government was able to save $140 million over the 20- 
year contract term, while it improved the system capacity and reliability. Hannon 
Armstrong structured and funded the transaction.10
 
Figure 4: The Economic Solution to Case Study 
From Hannon Armstrong website; 
http://www.hannonarmstrong.com/files/CMANorwaycs.ppt.ppt#261,5,Slide 5 
 
The transaction is structured as Hannon Armstrong’s purchase of NASA and 
NOAA receivables from NSC.  These receivables arise pursuant to the Intergovernmental 
Agreement.  Later, NOAA and NASA will make their Contract Payments to the Hannon 
Armstrong Space Centre Funding account according to the Assignment Agreement and 
                                                 
10 U.S. General Services Administration-Office of Citizen Services and Communications Newsletter-
Innovative Funding; Government Agencies: Meeting the Challenge Using Innovative Funding Strategies; 
Dan McMahon & Hannon Armstrong; Issue 15; Oct 2004; pg 16; available http://www.gsa.gov/intergov 
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the Lender, who provided the initial capital, will receive its debt service payments from 
this account.  
The diagram in Figure 5 depicts the flow of funds in the financing solution that 
was explained above. 
 
Figure 5: The Financing Solution to Case Study 
From Hannon Armstrong website; 
 http://www.hannonarmstrong.com/files/CMANorwaycs.ppt.ppt#262,6,Slide 6 
 
Hannon Armstrong raised the money for the up-front capital required for the 
project through private placement among its investors.  Unlike public issue of stocks and 
bonds where the law mandates extensive dissemination of information about the project 
to the public, private placement usually involves raising money from sophisticated 
financial institutions, such as major banks, pension funds, and large insurance 
companies.11  Unlike other sectors of the capital markets, investing in federal contract 
financing requires a refined understanding of how federal operations differ from 
commercial operations.  Moreover, once these sophisticated institutional investors 
                                                 
11 Defense News; Finding Savings Up Front-Private Investors Finance Fiber-Optic Link Near Arctic 
Circle; Gopal Ratnam; Nov. 17, 2003; Vol. 18, No. 43. 
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understand the real, as opposed to perceived, risks of federal contracts, they accept a 
lower return commensurate with the lower risk.  Thus, the cost of capital is lower, as is 
ultimately the price for the service provided.  The $40 million raised by Hannon 
Armstrong for this fiber-optic system remained in an escrow account and was paid to 
Tyco when it met milestones determined by the Norwegian agency.  Hannon 
Armstrong’s return on investment is not realized until the payments are made over a 
period of years by NASA and the IPO, which includes NOAA, the DoD, and the DoC. 
Total repayments will total about $50 million over five years. 
The cable will cost each agency $5 million a year for five years.  Under an 
agreement with the Norwegian Space Center, the agencies will then have almost free use 
of it until 2030.  The agencies will save about $1 million a year over the cost of using the 
relay satellite for five years, and then each will save the whole $6 million a year for 15 
more years, according to Bill Watson, program executive in NASA’s Office of Earth 
Science.12  For a total of $50 million, $190 million in future costs will be avoided saving 
around $140 million for NASA and the OIP.  This is supported in the following 
statement: 
The financing illustrates how the government can utilize private capital to 
save the public sector a lot of money while upgrading its service. NASA 
and NOAA will each realize an immediate $1 million per year cost 
savings by switching service to the fiber optic cable, instead of 
commercial satellite data transmission. After the initial 5-year period, the 
agencies will no longer owe service payments and will each be able to 
realize full savings for the next 22 years…the advantages for the U.S. 
government were clear as agencies are able to access a critical service 
without seeking new Congressional appropriations.13
                                                 
12 Federal Computer Week; Listening to the Arctic Skies-NASA, NOAA use Norwegian Facility to 
gather weather and climate data form satellites; Michael Hardy; Jan 06, 2004. 
13 U.S. General Services Administration-Office of Citizen Services and Communications Newsletter-
Innovative Funding; Government Agencies: Meeting the Challenge Using Innovative Funding Strategies; 
Dan McMahon & Hannon Armstrong; Issue 15; Oct 2004; pg 16; available http://www.gsa.gov/intergov 
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5. Operational Aspect of the Arctic Circle Fiber-Optic Project 
With the installation of a dual fiber ring communications network to SvalSat, 
transmission speed of the system improved significantly; the new system is twelve times 
faster than the old system.14  In addition to a major increase in bandwidth, reliability 
improved significantly.  The SvalSat tracking station provides the ideal location for 
maximum visibility (transmission window) to communicate with polar-orbiting satellites 
on each of their approximately 14 daily orbits around the earth.  This visibility along with 
a robust communications network enables critical operational missions and the collection 
of extremely high-resolution data to achieve the best, most reliable performance possible 
to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the United States and its global partners. 
Due to the very low angle to the horizon, the Intelsat satellite link experiences 
various transmission disruptions that occur due to bi-annual sun outages and other 
atmospheric effects that alter data reliability and timeliness.  Although there are receiving 
stations in Fairbanks, Alaska and Wallops Island, Virginia, these stations have blind spots 
that prevent them from seeing the satellites and downloading their data on three of their 
fourteen daily orbits.15  Finally, there is a material economic benefit since the cost of the 
current leased telecom satellite capacity is over $6 million per year. 
6. Risks Associated with the Arctic Circle Fiber-Optic Project 
NOAA and NASA each have the right to terminate for convenience their 
respective use of the telecommunications services pursuant to the Project Implementation 
Agreement (PIP)/ Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  In either case, a termination 
prior to an agency’s final payment will cause the agency to pay to NSC the unpaid part of 
the payment schedule set forth in the PIP three months after the termination date. This 
termination amount will be sufficient to fully amortize the Hannon Armstrong investment 
and cover interest for the two intervening months between termination and payment of 
the termination amount. 
                                                 
14 The rate of transmission over this telecom satellite was approximately 48 million bits per second. 
(Mbps) (as compared to the two 155 Mbps channels that NASA and NOAA will each be allotted for a total 
of 620 Mbps from the Project’s cable capacity. 
15 U.S. General Services Administration-Office of Citizen Services and Communications Newsletter-
Innovative Funding; Government Agencies: Meeting the Challenge Using Innovative Funding Strategies; 
Dan McMahon & Hannon Armstrong; Issue 15; Oct 2004; pg 16; available http://www.gsa.gov/intergov 
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Additionally, the contract has a non-appropriation clause. Specifically, Article 4 
of the Intergovernmental Agreement states that “obligations under this Agreement and 
any implementing arrangements hereunder shall be subject to the availability of 
appropriated funds”. To fund this project, the U.S. government is using operating funds 
that are appropriated annually by the U.S. Congress.  According to the Anti-Deficiency 
Act, the Executive Department cannot commit to a binding obligation in excess of its 
funding.  This project represents a decrease in annual funding requirements compared to 
a commercial satellite lease, and offers significant long-term savings; therefore, it is 
assumed that funding will continue.  Nevertheless, the availability of future appropriated 
fund is an import risk to consider.  
7. Financial Analysis of the Fiber-Optic Cable Project  
The savings stated above were from publicly available sources and not created by 
the authors.  In this section, an independent net financial analysis concerning the capital 
investment of the fiber-optic line is presented.  Using the discounted present value 
technique, the time value of money (TVM) is taken into consideration.  The time value of 
money is based on the premise that one will prefer to receive a certain amount of money 
today than the same amount in the future, all else being equal.  The time value of money 
(TVM) or the discounted present value is one of the basic concepts of finance, developed 
by Leonardo Fibonacci in 1202.16    
For this analysis, the cost of capital to the government was deemed to be the ten-
year Treasury Bill rate.  We used the like-term US Treasury instrument rate as 
the discount rate in accordance with OMB Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates 
for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs.  As of April 2006, the rate of a ten-year 
and thirty-year Treasury Bill was approximately 5 percent.17    
The government ultimately chose to use Private-Public Partnership to fund the 
fiber-optic system.  This analysis will examine the options available to the government at 
the time they chose between the alternatives.  The life-cycle costs of the three options are 
                                                 
16 Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia; available: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_value_of_money. 
17 The Treasury Bill rates were used as the Government’s cost of capital; on Apr 09, 2006, the 10 year 
Treasury Bill rates was 4.98 percent and the 30 year T-bill rate was 5.05 percent.  Therefore, 5 percent was 
used in the analysis.  Rates accessed: http://money.cnn.com/markets/bondcenter/ 
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analyzed over the twenty-year period of the contract: status quo, pay for the fiber-optic 
line outright or using the financing method described above.  The weather and 
environmental information gathered at this particular location is critical.  Since no 
alternative locations are available, not collecting environmental and weather information 
at this location was eliminated as an option.   
Option 1 – Status quo:  If the current location is used and the fiber-optic line is 
not installed, then the government will make payments of ~$10 million a year for twenty 
years.18  Since the fiber-optic line will not be installed under this option, zero saving will 
be realized.  The total ~$200 million payments equate to a present value of ~$130.9 
million when discounted at 5 percent.   Therefore, the net cost of the status quo option is 
~$130.9 million over the 20 years. 
Option 2 – Pay for the fiber-optic line outright in one single lump-sum payment at 
the beginning of “year one” of the contract:  The one time expenditure (use of funds) of 
~$40 million would result in savings (sources) to the Government of ~$130.9 million 
over 20 years19; the result of the up-front investment is a net life-cycle cost of ~$40 
million ($40 million investment today eliminates payments for twenty-year period).20  
This option results in a net present value savings of $90.9 million ($130.9 million in 
savings minus the $40 million investment).  Note that savings will continue past twenty 
years since the project was undergone.    
Option 3 – Public-Private Partnership:  The present value of the payments (uses) 
under this option is ~$45.5 million over the five-year payment period; the first five years 
of the contract require $10 million a year in payments ($5 million per agency).  For the 
fifteen years after the payment period, the agencies will then have almost free use of the 
fiber-optic line under an agreement with the Norwegian Space Center.  The present value 
of the savings realized during this period is ~$109 million.21  Since these savings will not 
be realized until after year five, the savings must be discounted back to period one, 
                                                 
18 With the additional requirements of the NPP and NPOESS programs, combined NOAA/NASA 
telecommunications costs using existing leased satellite capacity for telecommunications transmission 
would have been approximately $10 million per year.   
19 $10 million  a year * 20 years discounted at 5%, annuity due. 
20 almost free use of the fiber-optic line under an agreement with the Norwegian Space Center. 
21 $10 millon a year for 15 years discounted at 5%. 
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resulting in savings of ~$85.4 million.  Therefore, this option results in a net present 
value savings of ~$39.9 million ($85.4 million in savings minus the ~$45.5 million 
investment discounted over five years) over the twenty-year period analyzed.  Note: 
savings will continue past twenty years since the project was undergone.   
The chart below summarizes the net savings from the financing alternatives that 
were compared above (millions). 
Options   (Over Twenty year contract) 
  Upfront Uses Outflow Inflow Life-cycle costs 
1) Status quo  130.9  130.9 
2) Purchase system 40  -130.9 -90.9 
3) Private-Public Partnership  45.5 -85.4 -39.9 
Figure 6:  Net Savings Over Twenty Year Period (millions) 22
  
From the analysis, the “cheapest” option for the government is to pay for the $40 
million initial capital investment upfront.  The discounted savings realized by this option 
is ~$90.9 million versus a savings of ~$39.9 million using Private-Public financing.  Both 
of the options trump the status quo, which results in the highest life-cycle cost.  While 
numbers can help quantify each alternative, it does not take sophisticated financial 
analysis to come to the aforementioned conclusion.  While, it always appears cheaper to 
purchase an asset upfront because there are zero finance charges, money from the 
treasury is not free nor is private sector capital.  Since capital is not readily available and 
the Federal Government operates at a deficit, the funds must be borrowed to purchase an 
asset outright.  Therefore, the cost of capital must be considered in making a comparison 
against the cost of the financing option.   
If there were an infinite amount of appropriated funds, the ideal solution would be 
to fund this project upfront.  However, a finite amount of funds is available for use in the 
federal government, as is the case in any corporation; therefore, every project can not be 
funded.  This case is more of a question of: should we finance or do without the upgrade 
and forgo the future saving and increased efficiencies.  
                                                 
22 Present Values rounded; calculated with Hewlett Packard 10B financial calculator; may differ 
slightly from Present Value table calculations. 
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 This financial analysis must be expanded to include the opportunity cost of a $40 
million project.  Opportunity cost is a term used in economics to mean that the cost of an 
opportunity forgone (and the benefits that could be received from that opportunity), or the 
most valuable forgone alternative.23  The lack of appropriated funds and the opportunity 
cost of spending the $40 million upfront make a compelling argument for using innovate 
public-private partnership financing solutions. 
While quantitative data help support a decision, it is important to look at the 
qualitative data such as the operational aspects of the project mentioned in the operational 
aspects section above.  As mentioned previously, with the installation of a dual fiber ring 
communications network to SvalSat, transmission speed, bandwidth, and reliability of the 
system improved significantly.24  Operational improvements of the new system must be 
taken into consideration. 
 Through Executive Order (E.O.) 13123, dated June 8, 1999, the Executive branch 
strengthened the government’s position on private financing already authorized by 
Congress.   
DOE and OMB shall also explore the creation of financing agreements 
with private sector suppliers to provide private funding to offset higher up-
front costs of efficient products.25
 The CEO of Hannon Armstrong, Jeffrey Eckel, noted, “By using this 
unconventional financing approach, Norway and the U.S. government were able to access 
a critical service without seeking new appropriated dollars from Congress.”26   
The authors of this project would agree that without the use of this innovative 
financing agreement, this necessary link would have been a “non-starter” and that would 
not be in the best interest of the American taxpayers and National Security.  Mr. Eckel 
also said  the deal is unlikely to create any contractual or legal precedents that would 
                                                 
23Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia; available:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunity_cost 
24 The rate of transmission over this telecom satellite was approximately 48 million bits per second 
(Mbps) (as compared to the two 155 Mbps channels that NASA and NOAA will each be allotted for a total 
of 620 Mbps from the Project’s cable capacity. 
25 Executive order 13123; Greening the Government Through Efficient Energy Management, June 8, 
1999; Sec 403 (b) (4). 
26 Defense News; Finding Savings Up Front-Private Investors Finance Fiber-Optic Link Near Arctic 
Circle; Gopal Ratnam; Nov. 17, 2003; Vol. 18, No. 43. 
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open the doors to similar deals in the industry; “it does show how new transactions could 
be conceived…frankly, that’s where the problem is; people don’t know that you can do 
this kind of stuff…it should be very interesting to Congress.”27
                                                 
27 Defense News; Finding Savings Up Front-Private Investors Finance Fiber-Optic Link Near Arctic 
Circle; Gopal Ratnam; Nov. 17, 2003; Vol. 18, No. 43. 
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III. CASE STUDY TWO 
A.   ADAPTING ESPC MODEL TO MOBILE ASSETS 
In this second case study, we examine another Hannon Armstrong financing 
arrangement.  The subject is an adaptation of an existing contract model, the Energy 
Savings Performance Contract (ESPC), to mobile assets.  If ESPCs were allowed to be 
applied to mobile assets, significant savings would result as demonstrated in the B-52H 
scenario below.  In order to understand how the EPSC model can be adapted to mobile 
asset, it is important to first understand how ESPCs work. Therefore, we will first explore 
the ESPC model and then the B-52 Bomber scenario. 
1. History of the ESPC Legislation 
The Energy Savings Performance Contract (ESPC) was originally authorized in 
the1986 amendments to the National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA) of 1978 
(codified at 42 USC8287).  Congress created the ESPC concept as a tool for agencies to 
use in meeting conservation and efficiency goals for federal buildings.  These goals were 
set forth in detail by various Executive Orders and directives requiring federal agencies to 
use 35 percent less energy by 2010 in comparison to 1985 usage levels.28  The 
infrastructure improvements necessary to comply with these initiatives would require 
significant up-front funds. However, Congressional appropriations were not sufficient to 
cover the costs.  Therefore, new creative financing partnerships with private sector firms 
would be imperative in funding the capital improvements necessary to comply with 
directives.    
As mentioned above, Congress first authorized the use of ESPCs to upgrade 
federal buildings in the 1986 amendments to NECPA.  But the general provisions of 
NECPA were made more specific and functional by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 
(EPACT).29  Later, in 1998, authority was extended through October 2003.  Most 
recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 105, extended the authority for all 
federal agencies to use ESPCs under section 801 of NAECA from October 01, 2003 until 
                                                 
28 U.S. DOE DOE/GO-102003-1744 July 2003. 
29 Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT), P.L. 102-486. 
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September 30, 2016.30  An increased public confidence in ESPCs has resulted in a 
significant ten-year extension of ESPC authority. 
One of the most important documents regarding energy reduction was Executive 
Order 13123--Greening the Government through Efficient Energy Management, dated 
June 8, 1999.  Through this E.O., the Executive Branch strengthened the government’s 
position on private financing that was already authorized by Congress.  The President 
encouraged private financing and defined requirements for agencies to meet specific 
energy reduction goals and most importantly, he supported the use of ESPCs to achieve 
them.  An excerpt from Section 403 (a) is as follows: 
Financial Mechanisms... Agencies shall maximize their use of available 
alternative financing contracting mechanisms, including Energy Savings 
Performance Contracts and utility energy-efficiency service contract, when life-
cycle cost-effective, to reduce energy use and cost in their facilities and 
operations. Energy Savings Performance Contracts, which are authorized under 
the National Energy Conservation Policy Act, as modified by the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992, and utility energy-efficiency services contracts provide significant 
opportunities for making federal facilities more energy efficient at not net cost to 
taxpayer.31
 
E.O. 13123 also established the Federal Energy Management Advisory 
Committee (FEMAC).  The purpose of the Committee is to provide the Department of 
Energy (DOE) with an independent view on enhancing energy management in the federal 
sector. The order directs FEMAC to address a range of issues, including how to improve 
the use of ESPCs and Utility Energy Service Contracts (UESCs), improve procurement 
of Energy Star® and other energy efficient products, improve building design, reduce 
process energy use, and enhance applications of efficient and renewable energy 
technologies at federal facilities.32  Figure 6 illustrates the federal progress towards their 
standard building energy reduction goal. 
                                                 
30 PL 109-58. 
31 Executive order 13123; Greening the Government Through Efficient Energy Management, June 8, 
1999; Sec 403 (b) (4). 
32 Federal Energy Management Advisory Committee (FEMAC); Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts (ESPC)-Report on ESPC authority; Sep 08, 2004. 
  Figure 7:  Federal Progress-Standard Building Energy Reduction Goal.   
From annual data submission to FEMP by all federal agencies for its Annual Report to 
Congress on Federal Government Energy Management 
 
2. How ESPCs Work 
ESPCs are highly specialized federal contracts that allow the federal government 
to upgrade obsolete capital assets in the absence of capital appropriations.  Energy service 
companies finance, install, and maintain new energy efficient equipment in government 
facilities.  Energy efficient equipment such as lighting, boilers, chillers, etc., is installed 
to replace the currently installed inefficient capital assets.  ESPCs are similar to “share-
in-savings contracts,” which enable federal agencies to obtain capital more quickly than 
if they had to go through traditional appropriations.  Agencies   provide no capital 
upfront, because contractors finance the entire investment.  But unlike most share-in-
savings contracts, ESPC payments are capped in a way that the government realizes 
excess savings beyond the amount used to amortize the initial capital cost of the upgrade 
that produces that savings.  Thus, the contractor bears all the downside risk of less-than-
expected savings, while the federal agency enjoys all the upside reward of better-than-
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expected savings.  Truly, this is the best possible risk allocation for the federal agency 
and the taxpayer.    
The main difference between ESPCs and operating leases is that ESPCs are paid 
from savings; another important difference is that federal agencies own the subject assets 
immediately under an ESPC.  While both ESPCs and leases allow the federal government 
to avoid paying the total cost of an asset up front, under an ESPC, title transfers to the 
federal government as soon as the asset is accepted by the government. The familiar 
defense acquisition management acronym, Government-Owned and Government-
Operated (GOGO) assets apply to ESPCs.33
Using an ESPC avoids the myriad of issues related to federal leases such as 
allocating risk of loss, insurance, restrictions on use, and disposition of the asset at the 
end of the lease.  This important aspect of ESPCs means that ESPCs are most appropriate 
for assets that the Federal government intends to keep for the long term.  This is why 
ESPCs have traditionally been used to upgrade assets that are permanently embedded in 
the infrastructure of federal installations.  This is also why ESPCs generally require 
perhaps the most rigorous life-cycle cost analysis of any type of federal contract. 
3. Cost/Savings to the Government 
The Alliance to Save Energy, a non-profit coalition of Energy Service Companies 
ESCOs and other groups, estimates that the federal government wastes $1 billion each 
year on its buildings that use energy inefficiently.34   Before the inception of an ESPC, 
the federal government used taxpayer dollars to pay for utility bills and operation and 
maintenance costs for federal buildings, which are often old and energy inefficient.  Due 
to appropriated fund limitations, the lack of funds frustrates agencies’ efforts to meet 
their energy efficiency, water conservation, and renewable energy goals.  
At initiation of the ESPC, ESCOs recommend potential Energy Conservation 
Measures (ECMs), install the equipment, and then verify that the improvements yield 
intended results.  Financial services firms, such as Hannon Armstrong, raise the money 
                                                 
33 It should be noted, however, that ESCOs often provide long-term service and maintenance for the 
upgrades as an integral part of the ESPC. 
34 Alliance to Save Energy; Fact Sheet; Updated May 2005. 
for the capital improvements through private placement among various investors.  
Without ESPCs, agencies would have to reassess their budget plans to accommodate 
investments in ECM and/or Congress would be asked to appropriate funds to finance 
investments to meet currently required energy consumption goals.35
During the ESPC, the government pays for upgrades, with interest, out of the 
stream of savings generated by the upgrades over a period of time up to twenty-five 
years.  By law36, the government pays no more than it would have paid for utilities if it 
had not implemented the ESPC.  After the ESPC expires, the government keeps all of the 
savings, freeing up even more taxpayer dollars to be used for other priorities. The chart 
below graphically illustrates the Agency’s cash flows before, during, and after the ESPC, 
as described in Figure 7. 
 
  Figure 8:  Agency’s Cash Flows Before, During and After ESPCs 
From Federal Energy Management Program; DOE/GO-102003-1744 July 2003 
 
4. Risk Exposure in ESPCs 
The primary reason for success of the ESPC lies in the unique allocation of risk in an 
ESPC.  Simply put, it is the ESPC contractor, not the government, who bears the risk of 
generating savings to pay for the acquired assets over time.  Moreover, if savings are 
generated in amounts that exceed the ESPC payments, the government retains all excess 
                                                 
35 GAO 05-55. 
36 H.R. 6 signed into law by President Bush Aug 2, 2005; PL 109-58.  
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savings.37  Under such conditions, it is hard to imagine how the federal government could 
lose.  It is equally hard to imagine that any contractor would ever agree to an ESPC 
unless it had absolute confidence that the asset will generate the promised savings.  The 
bottom line is that ESPCs work well for both the federal government and contractors 
because no contractor ever enters into an ESPC unless the promised benefits to the 
federal government are, for all practical purposes, a sure thing.  However, it is also true 
that ESPCs allow the federal government to retain certain risks when it is logical to do so.  
The most common risk retained by the federal government under an ESPC is the 
utilization rate of an asset.  Even the most efficient asset cannot produce savings if it not 
used and it is generally only the federal agency that controls how much or how little its 
assets are used.  The federal government will therefore often stipulate the utilization rate 
of an asset in an ESPC.  Such stipulations are also used in cases where actual 
measurement and verification of savings are too costly or otherwise impractical for the 
federal agency.  Lighting systems in federal office buildings are perhaps the most 
common example of actual measurement and verification being impractical.  It is far 
more efficient to simply “stipulate” the utilization rate at, say, eight hours per day than to 
install data capture technology at every light switch.  
5. Historical Use of ESPCs 
While the Department of Defense alone contracted 60 percent of the projects and 70 
percent of the investment dollars38, ESPCs have been used in 18 different federal 
agencies and departments in 46 states.  This covers virtually every major federal 
installation.  In all, over 300 ESPC transactions have been executed between the federal 
government and major US energy service companies such as Honeywell and Johnson 
Controls.  The total value of these private-sector investments exceeds $1.8 billion.39 
These improvements save 14.4 trillion British Thermal Units (Btu) annually.40  To get a 
                                                 
37 Federal Energy Management Program; DOE/GO-102003-1744 July 2003. 
38 Produced for the U.S. Department of Energy by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, a DOE 
national laboratory; ORNL 2005-02583/jcn July 2005. 
39 Based on agency annual data submissions to FEMP from FY 1998 onward.. Produced for U.S. DOE 
by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, a DOE national laboratory  ORNL 2005-02583/jcn July 2005. 
40 Determined by applying the FY2000-2003 average of 8000 Btu saved annually per dollar invested 
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sense of the scope of the Btus saved, you can equate that saving to 143,000 households or 
a city of a half million.41  These projects will save the government $5 billion in energy 
costs after $3.5 billion of the savings are used to pay off project investments.  Net ESPC 
savings to the government are $1.5 billion.42
Initially, federal energy management projects were funded primarily through 
annual appropriations and innovative financing techniques such as ESPCs and Utility 
Energy Service Contracts (UESCs).  However, the role of ESPCs and UESCs has become 
increasingly more important to the federal government as individual agencies struggle to 
maintain and improve the energy and water efficiency of their facilities to meet energy 
reduction, environmental, and energy security goals.  This is especially true given the 
current increase in gas and oil prices and a major reason that use of ESPCs for mobile 
assets must be considered. 
  During the past four years, almost 80 percent of federal energy management 
projects were funded by alternative financing mechanisms.  Data reveals that the federal 
government’s use of ESPCs for energy conservation grew dramatically while 
appropriated funding for energy projects remained relatively constant or decreased.  In 
the past five years, ESPCs accounted for 51 percent of the total federal investment in 
energy conservation, while appropriations accounted for only 23 percent.43  The 
breakdown of federal spending by funding source to meet energy conservation goals is 
depicted in Figure 8.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
to the $1.8 billion ESPC investment.  ORNL 2005-02583/jcn July 2005. 
41 The conversion to households is derived from EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2005, Table A4.  ORNL 
2005-02583/jcn July 2005. 
42 Savings total is based on guaranteed savings (2.196 times investment per FY2000-2003 data); plus 
additional savings not guaranteed (ESCOs generally guarantee a conservative 95% of estimated savings); 
and 3 years of equipment service life after payments to ESCO end.  ORNL 2005-02583/jcn July 2005. 
43 Federal Energy Management Advisory Committee (FEMAC); Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts (ESPC)-Report on ESPC authority; Sep 08, 2004. 
 Figure 9:  Federal Spending by Funding Source to Meet Conservation Goals, 1999-2003 
 From: Federal Energy Management Advisory Committee (FEMAC); Energy 
 Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC)-Report on ESPC authority; Sep 08, 2004 
 
Super ESPCs are listed in Figure 8; therefore, we will briefly describe a Super 
ESPC. Awarding a stand alone ESPC can be very complex and time consuming. 
Recognizing this, the U.S. Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management Program 
(FEMP) created streamlined Super Energy Saving Performance Contracts (Super 
ESPCs).  Similar to other Federal “Indefinite-Delivery / Indefinite Quantity” (IDIQ), 
Multi-Awardee contracts, these "umbrella" contracts allow agencies to undertake 
multiple energy projects under the same contract.44  Using a Super ESPC is the preferred 
route over a traditional ESPC because of the streamlined process.  While Super ESPCs 
are an important part of the building ESPC contracting world, they are not relevant to 
potential mobile ESPC assets.  Aside from Honeywell, no Super ESPCs ESCO would be 
a likely player in the mobile ESPC market.  Also, the main reason Super ESPCs are so 
well suited to facility upgrades is that projects are generally small and site-specific.  In 
                                                 
44 U.S. Department of Energy - Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy; Updated 12/08/2005; 
www.eere.energy.gov/femp/financing/superespcs.cfm;  accessed Mar 04, 2006. 
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contrast, mobile ESPC projects would likely be so large that they would almost certainly 
be “one-off” contracts.   
In the decade-long Federal experience with ESPCs, these contracts have a 
significantly better record of success than the overall Federal contract experience.  There 
are no "Terminations for Default" on record and the few "Terminations for Convenience" 
cases have been generally precipitated by Federal agencies using end-of-year excess 
funds to "buying out" well-performing ESPCs.   
Note that there have been a handful of "Termination for Convenience" cases 
where the underlying asset was lost, such as a GSA building located near the World 
Trade Center that was destroyed on September 11, 2001.  This provides a useful example 
of how an ESPC is an appropriate and robust contracting model for upgrading combat 
aircraft that could be lost to enemy fire or accident. 
6. CBO and OMB Views of ESPCs 
While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) considers the ESPC 
program to be “budget neutral” and says it “saves the government money”45, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has a different view of ESPCs.  Although CBO had 
considered ESPCs to be budget neutral since their creation by Congress, in 2003 CBO 
reversed their policy just as Congress was considering ESPC reauthorization and 
expansion.  
CBO was created by Congress to quantify, or “score” the net cost to taxpayers of 
every bill that is considered by Congress.  So unlike the Executive Branch’s OMB, which 
scores actual government obligations in “real time,” CBO only investigates when 
legislation is proposed and Congress wants an estimate of its cost to taxpayers.46  Thus, 
when Congress first authorized the use of ESPCs to upgrade federal buildings in 1992, 
CBO correctly viewed ESPCs as budget-neutral and scored the program at zero cost.  
                                                 
45 Alliance to Save Energy; Fact Sheet; Updated May 2005. 
46  The cost, or score, of appropriations bills are relatively easy to estimate, since the dollar amounts 
are set forth in great specificity.  But “Authorization Bills” are more challenging, since it is unknown 
whether appropriations will follow the authorization and to what extent a discretionary program (such as 
ESPCs) will actually be used by the Executive Branch.  CBO deals with these unknowns by assuming full 
appropriations and projecting discretionary usage based on historical patterns.    
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Again, in 1998 when Congress reauthorized the ESPC program for an additional five 
years, CBO again scored the program at zero.   
However, when a new Energy Bill was introduced in early 2003, CBO reversed 
over a decade of precedent and scored the ESPC legislation as direct spending,47 refusing 
to consider the savings that offset any government payment, even though payments and 
savings under an ESPC are a mathematical identity.  The reason was that CBO viewed 
the savings as “discretionary” spending.  Now that the CBO scored the payments as 
direct spending and the savings as discretionary spending (not scored), ESPCs were no 
longer considered “budget neutral” by the CBO.  Because of such accounting fictions, the 
savings that accrue over time are not counted at all.  This new CBO scoring policy is 
illogical because no payment can ever be made unless savings in an equal or greater 
amount occur first.  But despite the flawed logic, few members of Congress will vote for 
a measure that appears to be a “budget-buster.”  Moreover, CBO was designed to be the 
honest broker in budget matters so many members of Congress respect the independent 
“referee” role of CBO, even when they disagree with the “ref” on a specific call.  This is 
not to say that CBO is never overruled; only that it is infrequent.  When it does occur, it 
is generally at the specific direction of the House and/or Senate Budget Committee 
Chairmen, to whom CBO reports.  Fortunately, despite the view of the CBO, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 passed, and this extended the authority for all federal agencies to use 
ESPCs under section 801of NECPA from October 1, 2003 until September 30, 2016.48   
As a result of constrained resources, ESPCs and PPPs involving third party 
financing are becoming more prevalent.  The appropriation process is time consuming 
and funding for “low-visibility” projects is increasingly rare.   The use of third party 
financing allows for funding of projects that would otherwise not get funded.  Hannon 
Armstrong’s funding of a fiber-optic system in the Arctic Circle is one example of the 
successful use of third-party financing for an asset-class that has not traditionally been 
contracted for in this way.   Analyzing and understanding how the application of third-
                                                 
47 CBO counts the total obligation to the government when the contract is signed. 
48 PL 109-58 the passed bill with ESPC reauthorization despite CBO’s adverse scoring of the measure 
at $2.9 billion.  See, http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6581&sequence=0
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party financing to a government project results in cost savings is an important element to 
applying ESPC to another asset class that has not traditionally been contracted for in this 
way: mobile assets.  The next few sections will outline the B-52 Bomber aircraft re-
engining project and how the ESPC model could benefit this effort.   
7. Applying the ESPC Model to the B-52H 
Applying the same innovative methods of financing used in the fiber-optic cable 
project to mobile assets is a key proposal of this research.   In the following sections we 
will examine using an ESPC to fund the B-52H re-engining project.  If ESPCs were 
allowed to be applied to mobile assets, the resulting savings would be much more 
significant than all savings to date under the program.  This is demonstrated in the 
following analysis of reengining the U.S. Air Force’s fleet of B-52H bombers. 
8. Introduction to the B-52H Scenario 
In 1996, Boeing submitted an unsolicited bid to re-engine the United States Air 
Force’s (AF) aging B-52H fleet.  The proposal was rejected because it was determined to 
be not cost effective for the Air Force.  The estimated payback period for the re-engine 
program was 36 years which was not deemed economically acceptable.  In a study 
prepared by Boeing and the AF, several reasons were listed as to why the program could 
not be justified: 
1. A constant fuel price calculated at the Defense Energy Support Centers annual 
rate. 
2. The AF estimated that the depot costs of maintaining current engines would 
remain stable and never exceed $299,000 per year through year 2037. 
3. Savings were not calculated for reduced refueling that would not be needed. 
4. Funding did not compete against higher priority programs. 
5. Premature retirement and reductions in force were considered program risks.49 
 Clearly, these AF assumptions made accepting a long-term proposal such as this 
nearly impossible.  Premature retirement and fleet reductions are legitimate factors that 
should be considered, but by assuming that fuel and maintenance costs would remain 
                                                 
49 The US Air Force and the Boeing Company, B-52H Re-engine Study: Summary of Findings 
(Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, 2003) 2-1. 
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stable over a 40-year period and not allowing for cost savings from reduced refueling 
needs, the AF allowed itself to reject the proposal.50   
In 2002, the Defense Science Board (DSB) released a report, which supported and 
recommended the Boeing plan as a way to upgrade the fleet of B-52H’s.  This report was 
subsequently updated and re-released in 2004.  They developed a list of seven 
conclusions as to why the re-engining plan should be accepted: 
1. The B-52H is the most versatile and cost effective bomber in the AF fleet. 
2. The B-52H is the only platform capable of launching Conventional Air Launched 
Cruise Missiles (CALCM) in the inventory. 
3. Further reduction in the B-52H fleet is not likely. 
4. The re-engining program has low technical risk. 
5. The plan gives the B-52H fleet greater operational range, reduces fuel burn and 
tanker demand, and reduced maintenance costs. 
6. The program could be used to further the use of Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts (ESPC) into mobile assets such as weapon systems.  
7. The AF task force determined that the benefits of the re-engining program 
outweighed the cost associated.51 
The two different views establish the basis for the debate on whether the B-52H 
fleet should be re-engined, and if so, how does the United States Congress pay for the 
cost.   
9. The Economic Aspect of the B-52H Re-engining Program 
When examining the economic benefit or detriment of the re-engining program, 
specific focus must be given to several key costs.  The analysis provided by the DSB task 
force lists these cost items and the estimated values to be used in the analysis.   
 Fuel Cost:  The AF allocates 22,000 flying hours for the B-52H fleet.  The current 
engines use a total of 3,310 gallons of fuel per hour.  Through re-engining, the AF team 
has concluded that the aircraft will use 33 percent less fuel, or a total of 2,218 gallons per 
flying hour.  This efficiency can save the AF about 24 million gallons of fuel over the 
                                                 
50 B52-H Re-engine Study.  2003, 2-1. 
51 B52-H Re-engine Study.  2003, 2-3. 
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course of a year and approximately 840 million gallons over the remaining 35 year life of 
the airframe.  The task force used the $1.20 per gallon figure from DESC to conclude the 
AF could save about $29 million annually on fuel costs which translates into about $1.0 
billion over the remaining life of the B-52H fleet.  However, the $1.20 number is an 
accounting simplification and does not take into account logistical assets needed to move, 
pump, or refuel from the air.52  Obviously, with the current rise of fuel prices, this 
number appears to be more off target than was once thought. 
The cost for refueling from tanker aircraft is significantly higher due to more of a 
logistical footprint.  At the request of the task force, the price per gallon of fuel received 
from tanker aircraft was calculated by the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
(CAIG).  They determined the refueling cost at $17.50 per gallon (1999 dollars).  The 
task force determined that, by increasing fuel efficiency, the AF would realize direct 
monetary savings from reducing the amount of fuel required by the B-52H fleet in flight.  
This information was not taken into account when the AF made the decision to forego the 
Boeing offer.53
When this information was placed into a tanker requirements model used by the 
AF, it was determined that the AF could refuel its current fleet with 55-83 fewer tanker 
aircraft.  The AF would realize some cost savings due to aircraft retirements from 
inventory or the extra aircraft could be used to support other missions that currently 
would not have been funded.  These savings may indeed be all the more critical since in 
July 2002, the Air Mobility Command, the major command which controls the AF tanker 
assets, stated that 500-600 tankers were needed in the fleet to ensure continued operations 
given realistic scenarios that could face the AF.54  Keep in mind that savings generated 
are still savings, even if the savings are immediately spent fulfilling the next highest 
critical priority.  Viewed another way, the critical shortfall in tankers can be addressed 
through “demand-side” measures as well as “supply-side” acquisition of additional tanker 
aircraft.  
                                                 
52 Defense Science Board Task Force, B-52H Re-engining (Washington, DC, 2004) 3-5. 
53 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 5. 
54 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 4-5. 
Engine Depot Overhaul Cost:  The report Boeing offered to the AF in 1996 
estimated a complete engine overhaul to cost $426,000.  The AF believed this number 
was extremely high and in its own cost analysis used $257,000 as the cost to overhaul a 
TF33-103 engine.  The task force that revisited this information found that in 2002, 
engine overhauls cost an average of 539,000.  Prices rose to $710,000 and $832,617 in 
2003 and 2004 respectively.  The profoundly flawed under-estimation of future engine 
overhaul cost was yet another incorrect factor that led to the AF turning down the initial 
proposal from Boeing.55   
In an effort to try and forecast the costs of depot overhauls, the DSB developed 
the chart in Figure 9 to show the costs of depot maintenance on the TF33-103 engines 
through the remaining life of the B-52H fleet.56
 
  Figure 10:  Forecast of the Costs of Depot Overhauls 
 From: Defense Science Board’s proposal to accept the re-engining plan 
 
The depot directorate adjusted maintenance numbers based on the historic trend 
of price increases.  The growth rate of costs was changed from 2 percent above inflation 
to 5 percent above inflation.  One need only look at the graph above to see that the 
                                                 
55 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 5-7. 
56 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 6. 
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forecast growth of future costs is a triumph of hope over experience.  Nevertheless, even 
with the numbers presented in this model, the cost of an engine overhaul in the final years 
of an aircraft’s life approaches $7.5 million.57  
Boeing has stated that due to recent increased technological advances the current 
engine that can be equipped on the B-52H fleet can be a “hang and forget” engine.  This 
means that the life of the engine, before it needs to be removed for maintenance, is longer 
than the remaining life of the airframe.  This could generate a significant cost savings to 
the AF that was ignored in the 1996 review.58
Engine Field Maintenance Cost:   The AF also maintains about 70 engines in the 
field per year.  These field overhauls cost the AF $462,400 each or about $32 million 
total cost per year.  Boeing estimated that through re-engining, the AF could lower this 
cost to about $13 million and save approximately $1 billion over the remaining life of the 
B-52H fleet.59
Annual Air Frame Usage Cost:  In 1996, when Boeing first introduced the 
proposal, the AF estimated that a normal B-52H aircraft would fly about 350 hours per 
year.  Since then much has changed and the aircraft are flown more than anticipated.   
During 2003 and 2004, the B-52H flew nearly an extra year per airframe to perform 
necessary operations. This increase in hours has the potential to change the estimates 
calculated by Boeing and the DSB task force.  If the fleet is being flown more in the near 
term, it may prove to be more advantageous to upgrade as soon as possible as older 
equipment may not be able to stand up to the rigors placed on it.60   
10. The Operational Aspect of the B-52H Re-engining Program 
While ESPCs ensure that upgrades will never be worse that cost-neutral, it is the 
operational advantages of the upgrade that motivate any use of ESPCs.  If the B-52H re-
engining project is approved, the current fleet will have a tremendous increase of 
operational effectiveness.  With greater fuel efficiency, the aircraft will have a much 
                                                 
57 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 7. 
58 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 7. 
59 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 7. 
60 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 7. 
greater range, reach, and loiter capability.  The DSB task force defined “range” as the 
distance an aircraft can fly without being refueled.  “Reach” is the sum of the distance an 
aircraft can fly without refueling and the distance its weaponry will travel.  Essentially, 
reach is the distance a platform can travel to strike a target.  “Loiter” is the time an 
aircraft can stay over a target to perform a mission with out the need for refueling.61
The current range of a loaded B-52H is 5,088 nautical miles.  Under the Boeing 
plan, this will increase to 7,420 nautical miles.  The data in Figure 10 is from the Defense 
Science Board’s proposal to accept the re-engining plan.  It shows that with the 46 
percent increase in range, the re-engined B-52H’s are able to fly from Diego-Garcia 
Airbase to Kabul and Baghdad without refueling.  Also, the re-engined planes will have 
over four hours loiter time at Kabul and about three hours loiter time for missions at 
Baghdad.  This will greatly reduce the number of sorties needed from tanker aircraft and 
help to free up space on the ramp.62
 
  Figure 11:  Unrefueled Diego Garcia to Kabul and Baghdad 
 From: Defense Science Board’s proposal to accept the re-engining plan 
 
With re-engining, a fully equipped B-52H will be able to use runways that are 20 
percent shorter than the 7,600 feet that it currently needs.  However, a re-engined B-52H 
                                                 
61 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 24. 
62 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 24, 25. 
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will need a runway 175 feet wide as opposed to the current required width needed of 150 
feet.  The impact of this width requirement is unknown by the authors at this time; 
however, it is expected to have minimal impact on the operation capacity of the B-52 
fleet.  In addition, a bomber fleet with an increased range will also allow the AF to use 
less forward operating locations (FOL) and reduce the need for host nation support 
during times requiring military operations.63   
11. The Environment Aspect of the B-52H Re-engining Program 
There are also environmental factors that would be affected by a re-engined B-
52H fleet.  The AF would realize a reduction in air and noise pollution.  Currently, B-
52H engines do not meet International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards for 
emissions whereas the re-engined planes would meet clean air standards with regard to 
smoke and fuel venting. Community noise factors will be reduced considerably under the 
re-engining program.  It is expected that the newer engines will reduce noise by about 12 
EPNdB which will bring the B-52H into compliance with Stage III noise standards.64  
Even with these improvements, there is a negative aspect with regards to the 
environment.  While it is true the re-engined B-52’s will use less fuel and cause less 
noise, the nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions will nearly double.  While the other pollutants 
are reduced by 30 percent, NOx levels increase two fold.  The net impact on the 
environment due to emissions cannot be determined.65   
12. Risks Associated with the Re-engining Program 
There is a significant risk involved with re-engining these aircraft.  The new 
engines that are being considered are 500 to 600 pounds heavier than the existing 
engines.  However, they add about 9,000 pounds of thrust per engine.  The total weight 
these newer engines are expected to add to the airframe is about 5,400 pounds.  Also, the 
wings must be altered.  There are ways to handle this impact, such as adding an auto-
rudder to the tail of the plane.  There are also other adjustments that would need to be 
made in other systems that arise from the addition of improved engines.  These 
                                                 
63 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 26. 
64 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 30, 31. 
65 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 30, 31. 
modifications will also cost money and should be factored into the cost savings when 
exploring the re-engining proposal.66
The threat of B-52H retirement is an issue that needs to be evaluated carefully.  
Ignoring the financial aspect and looking solely at the operational capability of the B-52H 
fleet, they could be operational through 2040.  The average plane logged 14,700 flight 
hours in 1999.  Boeing estimates that a B-52H should fly between 32,500 and 37,500 
hours in a lifetime.  As you can see from the graphic in Figure 11, most integral parts of 
the B-52H still have a long life ahead of them.67   
 
  Figure 12:  Economic Life of B-52H Structure 
 
The study also assumed that the AF bomber fleet would remain at 208 including 
94 B-52Hs.  Today, the AF still operates a fleet of 94 B-52Hs,68 although there is 
                                                 
66 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 32-35. 
67 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 13. 
68 The current fleet of 94 B-52Hs is comprised of two components.  The primary component of 76 B-
52Hs is the fleet size for which the AF routinely requests funding from Congress.  The second component 
of 18 “attrition reserve” B-52Hs is routinely funded via a Congressional “plus-up” that is above and beyond 
the funding requested by the Executive Branch.  The common belief is that the North Dakota Congressional 
delegation is the political force behind this annual budget supplement and, to be sure, the importance of 
Minot Air Force Base to the North Dakota economy is significant and the basing of 18 B-52Hs at Minot 
helps ensure this base remains active.  Having said that, some believe that the Air Force values the 
additional 18 aircraft and has come to rely on the Congressional champions’ annual efforts to give the Air 
Force more than DOD or the White House would likely support. 
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occasional debate over whether this should be reduced.  As of March 2006, the Air Force 
has proposed reducing the B-52H fleet to 56, provoking an immediate Congressional 
reaction.69   But even if the B-52 fleet is reduced, it is important to emphasize that a 
smaller fleet actually increases that economic benefit of reengining.   
The key justification for any upgrade of a legacy asset is that the asset will be 
utilized at a rate that results in the upgrade’s benefits exceeding the upgrade’s costs.  In 
the case of the B-52, the benefits of reengining are based on total fleet flight hours while 
the costs are based on the number of aircraft reengined.   If the number of aircraft in the 
fleet is reduced, the cost of reengining the fleet is reduced.  As long as the total number of 
flight hours of the fleet remains a function of military requirements, the only effect of a 
smaller fleet is that each aircraft will be utilized more, making reengining more, rather 
than less, compelling.  Even in an extreme case where the fleet might be too small to 
fulfill the military requirement demands, reengining those few aircraft would make more 
sense than ever, since utilization would be maximized.  Finally, it is essential to 
emphasize that this risk is common to any acquisition method that might be used to 
reengine the B-52 fleet, whether financed or not. 
13. Financing Options 
Conventional Acquisition:  This is the conventional model for Department of 
Defense purchases.  The Air Force would use 3010 Procurement Appropriations from 
Congress to pay for the new engines.  Assuming that this model would put reengined B-
52s into service at the same time as other alternatives, this would be the least cost method 
as it would reduce payment of interest rates of leases or other financing methods to the 
lower US Treasury interest rate.  The AF would purchase the engines outright and risk of 
future non-performance would, in all probability, be divided between the contractor and 
the AF under warranty terms commonly used in other conventional acquisitions.  A 
purchase of this size would most likely mean that Congress would have to borrow 
money, thus increasing the size of the national debt.  This would cause the interest 
                                                 
69 On March 16, 2006, the Senate passed a provision that effectively blocked any reduction in the size 
of the B-52 fleet.  See Senate Amendment 3139, which amends Senate Concurrent Resolution 83 (Budget 
Resolution of Fiscal Year 2007).  Both measures passed the Senate on March 16, 2006. 
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payments on national debt to increase, effectively offsetting some of the cost savings 
associated with this method. 
Lease:  This method involves payments to a contractor or financing institution 
over a finite period of time for use of the asset, in this case the B-52H engines.  Leases 
can offer a variety of benefits to lessees; however, many of these are not applicable to the 
federal government.  The government is not able to take advantage of the tax breaks that 
are associated with leasing, nor does it benefit from a reduced near-term money flow 
because the federal government theoretically has access to the money it needs.70  The 
lessor is also not able to take advantage of tax breaks and pass on savings to the 
government in the form of lower lease payments. 
Hourly Rate:  The Navy uses this method of contracting for buying engine 
maintenance and commercial airlines routinely pay for maintenance and engine usage 
under a single “Power by the Hour” contract.  Nevertheless, a pure commercial-style 
“Power by the Hour” is neither currently in use nor has it been used by the military in the 
past.71   
ESPC:  As mentioned previously in this research, ESPCs facilitate immediate 
ownership of assets while paying for the assets out of the savings the assets produce over 
time.  Because ESPCs are not dependent on Congressional budget cycles for capital 
appropriations, upgraded assets are fielded much faster under ESPCs.  The savings 
harvested in those years would otherwise be lost forever and represent a significant offset 
to the higher interest rate of ESPC as compared to US Treasury borrowing rate.72  The 
other unique aspect of ESPCs is that the risk of asset non-performance is shifted to the 
contractor for the entire contract period (up to 25 years), rather than the standard 
warranty used in conventional acquisitions.  In such warranties, both the time in which 
the contractor assumes risk of non-performance and the scope of performance covered is 
so limited that there is essentially no comparison with the performance guarantee of an 
ESPC. 
                                                 
70 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 37, 38. 
71 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 41. 
72 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 38-41. 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = J=39 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
14. How Can ESPCs be Used to Re-engine the B-52H Fleet? 
ESPCs have not been used to finance mobile assets in the past because the law 
that created ESPCs limits their use to facilities.  Nevertheless, the Defense Science 
Board, the Air Force, and Boeing (the original manufacturer of the B-52) all have studied 
reengining the B-52 fleet using the ESPC model.  All studies found that B-52 reengining 
under an ESPC was a compelling alternative should Congress modify the law to permit 
such an application of ESPCs. Under this scenario, a private financing firm pays for the 
engines (including any required non-recurring engineering and installation) up front and 
turns them over to the AF in exchange for payments over time.  These payments are 
made from savings realized by the AF in reduced fuel and maintenance costs.  After the 
term of the contract ends, all subsequent savings are retained by the AF – whether or not 
the savings produced during the contract term were sufficient to pay off the cost of 
reengining. Again, the contractor guarantees the savings, so if the savings fail to 
materialize, the government is not liable for payments to the contractor.  This is because 
the contractor can only, by law, be paid from savings that result from the upgrades 
installed under the ESPC.  This puts the pressure squarely on the contractor to perform up 
to its guarantee.73   
The studies all agree that new legislation would be required in order to use ESPCs 
for mobile assets such as B-52 reengining.  While Executive Order 13123 could be 
interpreted to encourage application of ESPCs to mobile assets, this interpretation is 
generally considered to be inconsistent with the ESPPC statutory provisions.  Since an 
Executive Order cannot change a statute (an act of Congress under its Constitutional 
power to create laws), it is safe to assume that in any case Congressional action would be 
needed before ESPCs could be used to upgrade mobile assets.   
A second aspect that deserves mention is that measuring savings in traditional 
ESPCs is relatively simple, but measuring savings in mobile ESPCs can be more 
challenging administratively.  The reason is that most military facilities using ESPCs 
have a single budget account from which all energy and maintenance expenses are drawn.  
Thus, if an ESPC produces energy and maintenance savings, it is a simple matter to pay 
                                                 
73 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 38-41. 
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the ESPC payment out of that same single account.   But a mobile ESPC upgrade like B-
52 reengining will generate savings in multiple budget accounts.  For example, fuel is 
saved not only through reduced consumption in the new engines of the B-52, but there is 
also fuel saved through reduced demand for tanker aircraft to carry fuel to the B-52s for 
mid-air refueling.   
Congress has made clear that any upgrade’s cost savings analysis (regardless of 
how that upgrade is acquired) must fully consider the cost of delivering fuel.74  Thus, the 
B-52 fuel and maintenance savings would be supplemented by the tanker aircraft fuel and 
maintenance savings, a completely different budget account.  This is even more 
administratively challenging since tanker aircraft are in such high demand that it is 
almost certain that tanker resources freed up by less B-52 demand would be immediately 
re-directed to other priorities.  In other words, the savings generated by B-52 reengining 
would be immediately spent elsewhere.  Inconvenient though this accounting may be, it 
is required by law whether conventional acquisition methods are used or another 
alternative is used.  Moreover, a strong reminder of priorities is called for at this point:  If 
reengining the B-52 fleet provides better warfighting capability while also providing 
better taxpayer value, the accounting system needs to conform to warfighter and taxpayer 
interests, not the other way around.  
There are also some other issues associated with the issuance of an ESPC for use 
on a mobile asset of this type.  Because the engines would be owned by the government, 
no revisions must be made for insurance, as would be the case if leased or procured under 
a “Power by the Hour” contract.  However, the question remains what happens if a 
reengined aircraft is destroyed.  Here the experience of the GSA building that was 
upgraded under a traditional ESPC and destroyed on September 11, 2001 is relevant.  The 
government could simply continue to make payments as if the assets were not destroyed 
or it could pay a termination liability lump-sum payment to close out the matter.  In the 
case of this GSA building, the government continued making payments for about six 
months and then terminated the contract for convenience, paying a lump-sum amount to 
                                                 
74 See P.L. 107-107. 
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the contractor in accordance with a termination liability schedule incorporated into the 
original contract.   
A mobile ESPC would actually offer additional flexibility, since unlike buildings, 
mobile assets can often “take up the slack” of a lost asset.  Thus, the total flight hours of a 
fleet of X aircraft can often be redistributed among (X-one) aircraft if one is lost.  As 
mentioned above, savings are generated by total utilization which is a function of the 
total fleet flight hours consumed.  Thus, real savings actually would not be reduced by a 
marginal decrease in aircraft, but only by a decrease in total fleet flight hours.  
Clearly, the government is looking to purchase commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
engines for use on a military aircraft.  These engines have not been designed to military 
specifications and would need to be “hardened” to military specifications – at least to the 
point that the 1950s TF-33 engines were “hardened.”  The contractor will assume this 
risk, since ESPCs provide no means of shifting this risk or cost to the government?  
Fortunately, the major commercial aircraft engine original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) are also the major OEMs of military engines for DOD.  Therefore, issues of 
converting COTS engines for use on B-52s is well within the expertise of these OEMs 
and is probably a risk that the government should insist be borne by the contractor even if 
reengining occurred under a conventional acquisition. In any case, the issue is common to 
all potential methods to fund the re-engining program.   
15. Should ESPCs be Used on the B-52H?  
The B-52H fleet is in need of engine upgrades.  Many of the planes have the 
original engines from the 1950’s that are still functional but grossly inefficient when 
compared to the technology available in modern engines.  You will not be able to find 
many who dispute this fact.  The major problem arises when discussions are held as to 
how to pay the bill.  While there are several methods of financing that could be 
appropriate for this transaction, the one method that stands out as being both feasible and 
economical is the ESPC method.   
If an ESPC is used for the purchase of new engines for the B-52H fleet, the 
engines should be available in the short term without a huge outlay of funding from the 
Congress.  This will allow the AF to strengthen its forces for current threats, as well as 
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future threats that may arise.  While the method would be slightly more costly than an 
outright purchase, the delivery time saving is a huge benefit, both in terms of capturing 
near-year economic savings and providing warfighters increased combat capability 
sooner.   
The DSB task force conducted a net present value (NPV) analysis concerning the B-
52H re-engining program and came out with favorable results supporting the program.  
They used the following assumptions through years 2004-2037: 
• 2004 depot engine price of $832,617 
• Depot price growth rate of 5% 
• OMB inflation index of 1.9% 
• FY96 EMD and production costs of $3.2B 
• 30 year OMB nominal discount rate of 5.5%.75 
The chart in Figure 12 shows the results of the NPV calculation following OMB 
guidelines:  
  Current Outlay Outlay After Re-Engining Outlay Reduction 
Fuel Purchase $1,774M $1,346M $429M 
Depot Purchase $3,136M $394M $2,743M 
Field Maintenance $657M $369M $288M 
Total $5,568M $2,108M $3,459M 
Program Cost     $3,195M 
Net Present Value     $264M 
Figure 13:  Estimated Change in Direct O&M Outlays with Reengining 
From: DSB task force 
 
The numbers show that the program will have a positive NPV at the 5.5% 
discount rate.  This is derived from calculating the difference in cash flows from the 
current outlay and outlays after re-engining of future years of fuel, depot maintenance, 
and field maintenance.  The cost of the program is then subtracted from this number to 
get the present value of the program.  The positive NPV shows that the program would be 
economically beneficial to the AF to re-engine the planes to save money over time.  This 
                                                 
75 B-52H Re-engining.  2004, 10. 
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clearly is not the only measure that should be used to decide on financing.  However, this 
measure should not be taken lightly.   
While it is also true that further retirement of B-52H’s is a major risk factor, this 
should further push the AF to upgrade their fleet.  With the current number of 94 aircraft 
in the B-52H inventory shrinking in the foreseeable future, these aircraft will need to be 
more and more reliable as the total fleet flight hours will not likely change significantly 
in the near term.  Fewer planes mean that the flight hours per plane will probably 
increase.  These aging aircraft have a chance to maintain a higher operational availability 
rate if more modern, technologically advanced engines are in place.   
The B-52H has been one of the most versatile and battle-tested aircraft of all time.  
These planes have been flying since the 1950’s and current plans call flying them until at 
least 2038.  Various upgrades have been made over the years to allow them to continue 
battlefield domination and this endeavor is yet another upgrades.  With more modern 
engines, the B-52H fleet will have less fuel burn, greater thrust, and more operational 
reliability.  The only hold-up to making this a reality is the question of how to fund it.   
There are methods that can be used that are alternatives to the conventional 
approach.  One of these methods, the ESPC method, proves to have great benefit to the 
AF.  It’s a win-win. The AF gets engines it needs now, and pays for them over time 
through savings accumulated through increased efficiencies over the older engines.  
While this method has never been used on a platform such as this in the past, it is a 
method that should not be overlooked.  It has substantial merit and should be given full 
consideration as the preferred method to upgrade the B-52H engines for now, and the 
future. 
16. Application of ESPC and Mobile Assets 
As was discussed above, historically, ESPCs have been used to reduce the energy 
consumption of federal facilities.  In 254 ESPCs awarded from 1999 to 2003, all were 
used to modernize government facilities.76   Current Congressional legislation limits the 
use of ESPCs to publicly owned buildings with no provisions given to mobile asset.   A 
                                                 
76 Government Accountability Office. (June 2005).  Energy Savings: Performance Contracts Offer.    
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recent report by the Federal Energy Management Advisory Committee (FEMAC) urges 
Congress to adopt pilot programs or temporary authority to test the use of ESPCs to 
reduce energy costs with mobile assets.77  A number of attempts to include legislation to 
authorize the use of ESPCs for mobile assets have failed to muster support.  In renewing 
the expired ESPC authority, Congress merely amended expired legislation by extending 
the program to 2016.  With higher fuel costs and a large portion of the federal 
government’s energy consumption attributed to operating mobile assets, energy savings 
contracts would be a viable solution.   
17. Legislative Changes 
Current legislation governing energy savings contracts would have to be amended 
in order for federal agencies to pursue external funding sources for modernization of 
mobile assets.   In 2003, a bill was proposed (H.R. 3339 National Defense Savings Act of 
2003) giving the DoD more flexibility in pursuing energy savings.  This bill would have 
allowed the DoD to initiate ten pilot programs to determine the feasibility of applying 
ESPC to mobile assets.   In the two years that this legislation was introduced within the 
Congress it did not make it into law.  Support for applying ESPCs is not only lacking in 
the Congress, but in OMB as well.  In a statement identifying concerns regarding a 
legislative proposal to include ESPC use to mobile assets, OMB stated:  
The Administration would object to the movement of the Energy Savings 
Performance Contracts (ESPCs) authority from DOE to DOD. In addition, we 
would oppose the expansion of ESPC authorities to non-building applications 
since it is inconsistent with federal fiscal and procurement policies. The 
Administration supports immediate extension of current ESPC authority for all 
agencies. 78
 
Beyond just legislation, federal fiscal and procurement policies will also have to be 
amended to accommodate mobile assets.  Though the opposition to doing so may seem 
insurmountable, the President’s State of the Union address in 2006 directing the country 
                                                 
77 Federal Energy Management Advisory Committee.  (September 8, 2004).  Energy Savings 
Performance Contracts (ESPC): Report on ESPC Authority.  Washington DC: Author. 
78 Office of Management and Budget.  (May 19, 2004).  Statement of Administration Policy: S. 2400.          
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.  Washington DC: Author. 
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to reduce our reliance on foreign energy, may be enough to make ESPC use for mobile 
assets a reality.    
18. Argument Against the Use of ESPC for Mobile Assets  
Opponents of using energy savings contracts for mobile assets argue that the 
process side-steps congressional authority and the appropriations process.  The opponents 
also contend that no entity can borrow cheaper than the federal government and to use 
corporate financing would be a waste of taxpayer’s dollars because it lines the pockets of 
“money hungry” corporations.  However, little attention is paid to the fact that, with ever 
constraining budgets, the likelihood of federal agencies receiving funds to upgrade 
mobile assets is slim to none. While maintaining the status quo retains Congressional 
power and oversight, millions of dollars in taxpayer savings through reduced energy 
consumption are lost.     
19. Proponents’ Argument for the Use of ESPCs for Mobile Assets 
Supporters of using energy savings contracts with mobile assets contend that the 
energy savings from upgrades would be real and that it costs more to do nothing given 
the inefficiencies of many platforms being used today.   Proponents also contend that the 
current Congressional Budget Office method for scoring ESPCs does not accurately 
represent the savings that would be realized through ESPCs and the scoring by CBO 
needs to be revised.    
The cost savings are only part of the proponent’s argument.  Proponents also 
argue that ESPCs will modernize old, obsolete components of currently used platforms.   
The process to re-engine a B-52H would not only make the aircraft more energy efficient, 
but would provide for a better platform and create jobs in the process.  A January 2001 
Defense Science Board study examined modernizing 16 DoD weapon systems platforms 
to achieve energy savings. 79   The DSB study concluded that modernization of legacy 
systems would provide increased operational performance, reduce the logistics tail, 
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decrease green house gas emissions, and offer a significant return on investment to the 
DoD.80
                                                 
80 Defense Science Board Task Force on Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons Platforms.  (January 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS  
A.  CONCLUSION 
The federal government’s historical use of public-private partnerships and related 
issues has been studied from different viewpoints.  We have demonstrated that PPPs are 
very effective in providing applications of innovative financing arrangements by Hannon 
Armstrong, LLC.  Hannon Armstrong’s “fee for service contract” solution to a lack of 
appropriated funds for a needed fiber-optic link near the Arctic Circle saved the 
government $140 million.  We believe that applying Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts to mobile assets could further reduce the energy consumption of the 
Department of Defense and save taxpayers millions of dollars.  Few argue about the 
impact that ESPCs have had in generating energy savings in fixed assets.  Ideally, the 
federal government would use appropriated dollars to fund energy saving upgrades to all 
assets.  However, the appropriations process is slow, time consuming, and federal funds 
are often not available or are prioritized to other projects.  Innovative methods, such as 
that demonstrated by Hannon Armstrong’s financing of the fiber-optic cable project, 
should be applied to mobile assets, such as the re-engining program for the B-52H fleet, 
so that these non-starter projects will become a reality and the cost savings can be 
realized. 
B.  FUTURE RESEARCH TOPICS 
Public Private Partnerships is a vast area of study.  Future research topics could 
include: 1) a detailed examination of the legislative and policy changes that would be 
necessary to implement ESPCs for mobile assets, 2) analyzing the lessons learned from 
major PPPs throughout history, 3) determining the benefits of PPPs and cost savings 
realized over the long-term, 4) examining how functions within the federal government 
once deemed “inherently governmental” are slowly being privatized and determining the 
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